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The advent of modem medicine has increased the quality of available
health care services dramatically. The use of outpatient prescription drugs
has allowed today's patients to live longer, more productive lives.
However, the shift from invasive inpatient procedures to outpatient
pharmaceuticals has come at a price. There has been a significant increase
in demand,1 prices,2 per capita expenses, 3 and total expenditures 4 for these
prescription drugs.
Moreover, the burden of these sizeable expenses has not been distributed
uniformly across the population. In particular, senior citizens have greater
health care needs and, therefore, are most likely to incur significant
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7, available at
http://www.nihcm.org/spending2001.pdf (May 6, 2002). In 1992, pharmacists filled 1.9
billion prescriptions while just eight years later, in 2000, they filled over 3.1 billion. This
study found a 63% increase in the number of prescriptions filled in the United States.
Figures are for prescriptions dispensed in retail outlets.
2. Id. at 8. Between 2000 and 2001, the average price of a prescription drug increased
over 10%.
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available
at
http://dcc2.bumc.bu.edu/hs/sager/
Westem%20Mass%20testimony/o20Apr/ 2001.pdf (April 17, 2001).
MONITORING
4.

PROJECT

1,

MARIE N. STAGNEITTI, MEDICAL EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY, STATISTICAL BRIEF #

21: TRENDS IN OUTPATIENT PRESCRIPTION DRUG UTILIZATION AND EXPENDITURES: 19972000, available at http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/papers/st2l/stat2l.htn (last visited Nov. 23,
2004). Total expenditures on outpatient pharmaceuticals grew from $72.3 billion in 1997 to
$103 billion in 2000. Over the same time period, the proportion of expenses attributable to
outpatient prescriptions grew from 13.1% to 16.4% of overall medical expenditures.
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One recent study found adults over the age of

sixty-five experienced annual "out-of-pocket" pharmaceutical expenditures
more than double that of the average adult under the age of sixty-five. 6
Medicare,7 the public health insurance system for older Americans, has
struggled to keep pace with these expenditure trends of modem medicine.
For example, prior to recent legislation, traditional fee-for-service (FFS)
Medicare 8 lacked any significant form of an outpatient prescription drug
benefit. 9 This lack of coverage had a detrimental impact on seniors who
increasingly relied upon medications but were unable to acquire necessary
supplementary drug coverage.' 0 Some seniors lacking coverage chose to
travel abroad to purchase their medications," while others without such
recourse faced the difficult choice between spending their
limited financial
12
resources on medication, or on food or other essentials.
In reaction to this problem, various policymakers touted plans designed
to relieve seniors' potential hardship by reforming Medicare to include a
prescription drug benefit. 13 Following the midterm elections of 2002,
President George W. Bush formally introduced a plan for Medicare reform
during his 2003 State of the Union Address. 14 Strenuous debate surrounded
5.

Id.

6. Id. In 2000, outpatient prescription expenditures for those over the age of sixty-five
averaged $1,102 as compared to $485 for the average adult under the age of sixty-five.
Similar findings exist for the years immediately prior to 2000.
7. Social Security Amendments of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2004). With former
President Truman in attendance, President Johnson signed the Medicare legislation on July
30, 1965 and issued the first Medicare card to Truman, who had first championed the
creation of the Medicare system. ALONZO L. HAMBY, MAN OF THE PEOPLE: A LIFE OF
HARRY S. TRUMAN 625 (1995).
8. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE FACT SHEET: MEDICARE AT A
GLANCE, available at www.kff.org/medicare/1066-07.cfm (Mar. 22, 2004) [hereinafter
MEDICARE FACT SHEET] (referring to Medicare Parts A and B).
9. Jennifer Rak, An Rxfor Reform: A Medicare PrescriptionDrug Benefit, 12 HEALTH
MATRIX 449, 451-52 (2002) (noting that after 1997, prescription drug coverage was
available to a senior who chose to opt out of traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare and

enter Medicare managed care); The Balanced Budget Act of 1997: A Current Look at its
Impact on Patients and Providers: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Health and
Environment, Committee on Commerce, H.R., 106th Cong. (statement of Gail Wilensky,
Chair,
Medicare
Payment
Advisory
Commission),
available
at
http://www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_testimony/071900.pdf (2000).
10. MICHAEL E. GLUCK, NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., A MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG
BENEFIT 2, availableat http://www.nasi.org/Medicare/Briefs/medbrl.htm (1999).

11. DeNeen L. Brown, The Drug Store Right Next Door; Prices Lure Americans to
Canada,WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2000, at A24.
12. Sherry Jacobson, High Price of Prescriptions Adds to Sick Seniors' Suffering;
Paying Entire Drug Cost Can Leaved Them Strapped,CHI. TRIB., Nov. 9, 2000, at C7.
13. Rak, supra note 9, at 491-504.
14. Press Release, President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html (Jan. 28, 2003).
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the details of his proposal as Congress considered it along with a wide
variety of competing Medicare reform proposals.15 After months of
deliberation, the conference committee reached agreement and the House
and Senate approved a final version of the bill. 16 On December 8, 2003,
President Bush signed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 (MPDIMA). 7
Beginning in calendar year 2006, MPDIMA adds Part D to Medicare,
establishing a new voluntary prescription drug benefit through a privatelyoffered prescription drug program.' 8 MPDIMA also allows seniors to opt
out of traditional Medicare by enrolling in Medicare Advantage (MA), a
managed care program with integrated drug coverage. 19 A significant
number of low-income seniors that lack the resources to purchase
supplementary coverage and are ineligible for Medicaid 20 may now receive
substantial benefits from this legislation. 21 However, despite the new
benefits MPDIMA creates, a more thoughtfully-crafted version of the
legislation could provide more expansive, less expensive coverage for a
greater number of Medicare-eligible seniors.22
This article begins with a brief overview of the Medicare system prior to
the passage of MPDIMA. Next, it highlights several key sections of the
legislation and outlines specific areas that Congress could modify to
provide greater value to both taxpayers and Medicare enrollees. Finally, the
article discusses cost-containment strategies to fund the effort to provide a
more substantial and cost-effective Medicare prescription drug benefit.

15. Amy Goldstein & Helen Dewar, Senators Propose Medicare Bill; Divisions Persist
on PrescriptionAidDespite BipartisanBacking, WASH. POST, Jun. 11, 2003, at A6.
16. Amy Goldstein, For GOP Leaders, Battles and Bruises Produce Medicare Bill,
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2003, at A8.
17. Dana Milbank & Claudia Deane, President Signs Medicare Drug Bill: Supporters,
Opponents Jockey for 2004 Edge, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2003, at Al.
18. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 42
U.S.C.A. § 1395 (West 2004) [hereinafter MPDIMA]. This act was recently codified and
was only available in the annotated version at press time.
19. Id.§ 101.
20. Id. § 1396. The Medicaid system leaves specific eligibility decisions to the
respective states. However, the statute sets forth the minimum coverage boundaries.
21. See id. § 121(a). Currently, all state Medicaid programs offer a prescription drug
benefit to seniors who meet individual state eligibility requirements.
22. EDWIN PARK ET AL., CTR. FOR BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES, THE TROUBLING
MEDICARE LEGISLATION, available at http://www.cbpp.org/l1-18-03health2.htm (revised
Dec. 8, 2003); Jacob Hacker & Theodore Marmor, Poison Pill: Why the New Reform Bill
Will Make Medicare's ProblemsBigger--and Even Harderto Fix, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 7,
2003, at D1; Trudy Lieberman, Killing Medicare,277 THE NATION 20, Dec. 15, 2003, at 4.
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I. THE MEDICARE SYSTEM PRIOR TO MPDIMA

As noted above, Medicare is a public insurance program that provides
health care coverage to most of America's seniors.
To be eligible, an
individual must be a citizen or resident alien 24 and at least sixty-five years
of age. 25 The Medicare system is financed through general tax revenues
and employer and employee contributions. Therefore, a potential recipient
must make contributions to the system in the form of payroll taxes for a
requisite number of years in order to be eligible for the program.26
Prior to MPDIMA, the Medicare program consisted of Parts A, B, and
C. 27 Part A primarily covered inpatient hospitalization, 28 while Part B
covered outpatient care and physician services. 29 Historically, traditional
fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare, Parts A and B, failed to cover the entire
range of available medical services. 30 Thus, prior to MPDIMA, Medicare
permitted enrollees to purchase supplemental benefits plans called
Medigap.3 1 Medigap provided seniors with extra coverage for additional
services, such as prescription drugs.32
In addition to Medigap, Part C (Medicare + Choice) allowed seniors to
opt out of traditional FFS Medicare through enrollment in privately-

23.

DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,

Medicare Infornation Resource, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicare/ (last
modified Sept. 16, 2004) (noting that Medicare provides coverage to approximately forty
million people including those aged sixty-five and older, individuals with certain disabilities,
and individuals with end-stage renal disease).
24. MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395i-2(a)(3).
25. Id. § 1395i-2(a)(1).
26. See id. § 1395i(a)(l)-(2) (Medicare Part A affords coverage to any citizen and his or
her spouse who has either provided a sufficient amount of payroll tax contribution or is
otherwise eligible to receive a monthly Social Security benefit. It allows those not eligible
through any other means to "buy in" to Medicare coverage through the payment of an
enrollment premium).
27. MEDICARE FACT SHEET, supra note 8.
28. MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395d-(a)(1). Payroll tax contributions to the Medicare
trust fund primarily finance Part A. Id.
29. MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395k(a). General tax revenues and enrollee copayments primarily finance Part B. Id. § 1395j.
30. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE + CHOICE, THE IMPACT OF THE 1997
BALANCED BUDGET ACT PAYMENT REFORMS ON BENEFICIARIES AND PLANS 11, available at

http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99137t.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
31. MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395ss.
32. Id. Services available through Medigap varied by provider, some Medigap plans did
provide drug coverage. However, some seniors found these plans either unaffordable or
altogether unavailable. See THE LEWIN GROUP, AARP PUB. POL'Y INST., RESTRICTING
UNDERWRITING AND PREMIUM RATING PRACTICES IN THE MEDIGAP MKT.: THE EXPERIENCE OF

THREE STATES 11-14, available at http://research.aarp.org/health/200101_medigap.pdf
(Jan. 2001).
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operated managed care plans. 33 Some Part C enrollees received additional
benefits not included in traditional FFS Medicare, including prescription
drug coverage.34 However, Part C managed care plans typically required
patients to choose a primary care physician from a list of plan-approved
35
doctors and often mandated program approval in order to see a specialist.
Furthermore, since many of the managed care plans faced financial
difficulties, some plan operators chose to discontinue coverage in certain
geographic markets, leaving many seniors without Part C coverage.3 6
TABLE 1: MEDICARE CHOICES BEFORE AND AFTER MPDIMA

Medicare Coverage
Options

Description

Part A
Parts A + B
(Traditional FFS

Hospital Insurance Program
Hospital Insurance Program and
Supplementary Medical Insurance

Available
Prior to
MPDIMA
X

After
MPDIMA

X

X

X

Medicare)

Parts A +B +Medigap

Traditional FFS Medicare with
choice of Medigap supplemental

X

coverage

Part C
(Medicare + Choice)
Medicare Advantage
Parts A +B +D

Managed Care

X

Managed Care

X

Traditional FFS Medicare with

X

I Prescription Drug Plan Benefit

II. OVERVIEW OF MPDIMA DRUG PLANS: THE PART D PRESCRIPTION
DRUG PLAN AND MEDICARE ADVANTAGE

A. PartD PrescriptionDrug Plans
President Bush has maintained that MPDIMA provides enrollees
33.
34.
35.

MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395w-21(a).
MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395(a)(1)(B).
See GERALDINE DALLEK, INST. FOR HEALTH

CARE RESEARCH AND POL'Y,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN MEDICARE + CHOICE 26-28, available

at http://www.kff.org/insurance/1449-protection.cfn (Dec. 1, 1998).
36. See TIMOTHY LAKE & RANDALL BROWN, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
MEDICARE + CHOICE WITHDRAWALS: UNDERSTANDING KEY FACTORS 10-11 (June 2002),
available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/6046-index.cfm; see also, Robert A. Berenson,
Medicare+Choice: Doubling or Disappearing?, HEALTH AFF., (Nov. 28, 2001) at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w .65vl/DCI.
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maximum flexibility by allowing them to choose their optimal plan.37
Starting in 2006, those qualified to enroll in Medicare Parts A and B will
also be eligible to enroll in a Medicare Part D prescription drug plan
(PDP). 8 MPDIMA requires every insurance provider to furnish either the
statutorily-defined coverage plan or its actuarial equivalent. 39 Alternatively,
MPDIMA allows enrollees to choose a Medicare Advantage managed care
plan that covers the range of services mirroring the aggregation of Parts A,
B, and D.4 °
Pursuant to the legislation, standard coverage under a Part D PDP
features a number of premiums, co-payments and coverage gaps.4 ' The
monthly premium for Part D will be approximately $35 in 2006, and may
rise to approximately $58 per month by 2013.42 The standard coverage43
under Part D also requires a separate annual deductible of $250.
Furthermore, it requires an enrollee to make a 25% co-payment with the
balance covered by the plan for annual true "out-of-pocket" prescription
drug expenditures between $250 and $2,250.44 However, for prescription
drug true out-of-pocket expenditures between $2,250 and $3,600, the
standard coverage features a "donut hole" coverage gap requiring an

37. Press Release, President George W. Bush, Keeping Our Promise to America's
Seniors: President Bush Signs the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 (Dec. 8, 2003), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/
medicare/ [hereinafter President Signs Medicare Act]. President Bush stated "[E]very senior
needs to know: if you don't want to change your current coverage, you don't have to change.
You're the one in charge. If you want to keep your Medicare the way it is, along with the
new prescription benefit, that is your right .... For the seniors of America, more choices and
more control will mean better health care." Id.
38. MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395w-101.
39. Id. § 1395w-102(a). Under MPDIMA, if adequate private market options fail to
materialize then government officials may supplement regions that are not adequately
covered by the private market with additional coverage to ensure that each geographic region
features a minimum of two prescription drug plans. Id. § 1395w-103(a). The Secretary of
Health and Human Services is required to ensure that each Part D eligible has at least two
qualifying plans within a given geographic area. The Secretary must allow such individual
the opportunity to enroll in a fallback plan if the region fails to meet the two plan
requirement.
40. Id. § 1395w-101.
41. Id. § 1395w-102(a)(2)(A)(I).
42.

JOINT ECON. COMM. DEMOCRATS, THE NEW MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG ACT:

INDEXING EFFECT ERODES BENEFIT 2 (2004) [hereinafter JOINT ECON. COMM. REP.].

This

brief cites a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study which projects that the average
premium for a Part D PDP plan will be $35 per month in 2006. Furthermore, the CBO study
projects that over the next decade per capita drug spending will increase by about 8.5%
annually. Thus, taking these two findings together, the CBO estimates monthly premium
will reach $58 by 2013 since this payment is not indexed for inflation.
43. MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395w-102.
44. Id.
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enrollee to pay all of his or her prescription drug costs. 45 Once total annual
expenditures reach $5,100, whereby corresponding true out-of-pocket
expenditures reach $3,600, the standard coverage may be subject to a
catastrophic cap,46 which covers
all additional costs except for a nominal
47
co-payment per prescription.

2: ILLUSTRATION OF THE "DONUT HOLE" COVERAGE GAP

TABLE

Deductible
0

Limited
Coverage

75%

Beneficiary Responsibility

No Coverage

Catastrophic
Coverage
95%

Total Drug Expenditures

Medicare Responsibility

To assist low-income seniors, MPDIMA also provides a subsidy 48 that
either reduces or eliminates a recipient's annual deductible, monthly Part D

45. Id.
46. Id. The size of the donut hole coverage gap is expected to grow since its upper and
lower bounds are not indexed for inflation.
47. Id. § 1395w-102(b)(4)(A)(i). This nominal co-payment is equal to the greater of 5%
of the prescription cost or the flat price of $2 for a multiple source drug as defined in Pub. L.
No. § 101-1860D-l(a)(4)(A)(1)(I) and $5 for any other type of prescription.
48. MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395w-114(a)(1). Assistance under this section is
available on a sliding scale with the maximum income for eligibility of 150% of the federal
poverty line. Id. § 1395w-114(a)(2)(A).
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premium, and out-of-pocket expenses.4 9 Since MPDIMA contains a
restriction on the purchase of new Medigap policies that provide
prescription drug coverage, this subsidy may prove particularly necessary
for low-income seniors.5 °
B. MedicareAdvantage
As an alternative to Parts A, B, and D, MPDIMA allows seniors to leave
traditional Medicare and enroll in Medicare Advantage (MA). 5' MA is a
comprehensive managed care program analogous to the former Medicare
Part C (Medicare + Choice) program. 52 To ensure managed care plan
participation in MA, MPDIMA has increased aggregate payments to these
plans by $1.3 billion for 2004 and 2005. 53 These increased payments grant
MA plans greater flexibility in their offerings. Thus, MA plans will not
only provide the same range of services available to recipients collectively
enrolled in Parts A, B and D,54 but also may offer additional benefits not
featured in Parts A, B, and D.' 5 Some of these additional benefits include
reduced cost sharing, dental, and vision services.56
III. OVERVIEW OF PROBLEMS WITH MPDIMA's DRUG PLAN DESIGN
While both Medicare Part D prescription drug plans and the Medicare
Advantage (MA) program will offer prescription drug coverage to a
significant number of seniors, a more carefully devised statutory design
could have enhanced public value for both Medicare recipients and
taxpayers.57 Specifically, Part D coverage set forth in MPDJMA is
inefficient because it fails to dovetail with current retiree drug programs,

49. Id. § 1395w-114.
50. Id. § 1395ss. This provision prohibits the sale, issuance, and renewal of new
Medigap policies containing prescription drug coverage. Id. Yet, Part D eligibles are
permitted to renew policies issued before Jan. 1, 2006, so long they are not concurrently
enrolled in Part D. Id.
51. Id. § 1395w-101(a)(1)(A).
52. Id. MA is similar to the Part C (Medicare + Choice) program. Yet, MA features
greater per patient reimbursement and requires plan operators to provide drug coverage. Part
C plus choice only authorized plan operators to provide drug coverage. THE HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE FACT SHEET: MEDICARE ADVANTAGE, available at
www.kff.org/medicare/2052-07.cfm (Mar. 2004) [hereinafter MA FACT SHEET].
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. PAULETrE MORGAN & HINDA CHAIK1ND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEDICARE
ADVANTAGE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO PRIVATE PLANS CURRENTLY SERVING MEDICARE
BENEFICIARIES, CRS Report RS21761, at 2-3 (Mar. 8, 2004).

56.
57.

Id.
Park, supra note 22.
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arguably creating the need for the legislation's expansive employer
subsidies.58 Furthermore, MPDIMA disadvantages "dual eligibles," which
are seniors qualifying for both Medicare and Medicaid due to their age and
indigent economic status. 5 9 Under MPDIMA, these seniors face much
higher co-payments than they currently pay under state Medicaid
programs. 60 Additionally, the limited drug formulary requirements under
MPDIMA may leave some seniors without coverage for certain brands of
medication.6'
MPDIMA creates an asymmetry in bargaining power between enrollees
and plan operators. Historically, beneficiaries had the option to either
enroll or decline a Medicare managed care plan at any time during the
year.62 However, starting in 2006, beneficiaries enrolled in MA plans can
only switch plans or disenroll from the program once per year, during a
specific time period.63
Furthermore, MPDIMA's deference towards managed care may
substantially increase the costs of providing a drug benefit. For example,
2004 Medicare payments to managed care plans were on average 107% of
the cost to cover similar benefits under traditional fee-for-service (FFS)
Medicare; in some areas, payments were 132% of FFS costs. 64 In addition
to its increased costs, many seniors have expressed strong antipathy towards
the managed care programs offered through Medicare.65 In response to this
concern, President Bush has noted that under MPDIMA seniors can keep
their traditional Medicare, enroll in prescription drug plans, and forgo
entrance into managed care.66 While his assertion may be technically
accurate, it does not adequately acknowledge the full range of choices that
seniors could face. The structure of MPDIMA presents seniors with a
58.

MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395w-132.

59. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
LIST AND DEFINITION OF MEDICARE/MEDICAID DUAL ELIGIBLES, available at

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/dualeligibles/bbadedef.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2004) [hereinafter
DUAL ELIGIBLE DEFINITION].
60. THE NEW MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG LAW: ISSUES FOR DUAL ELIGIBLES WITH

AND SERIOUS CONDITIONS, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/
loader.cfn?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfin&PagelD=40714 (June 2004) [hereinafter
ISSUES FOR DUAL ELIGIBLES]. See also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID AND SCHIP:
STATES' PREMIUM AND COST SHARING REQUIREMENTS FOR BENEFICIARIES 51-53 availableat
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04491 .pdf (Mar. 2004).
61. ISSUES FOR DUAL ELIGIBLES, supra note 60.
62. MA FACT SHEET, supranote 52.
63. Id.
64. Id. at2.
65. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., REACTIONS TO THE NEW MEDICARE LAW,
availableat http://www.kff.org/medicare/7099.cfm (June 2004).
66. President Signs Medicare Bill, supra note 37.
DISABILITIES
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choice between a Part D plan featuring a substantial coverage gap and an
MA managed care program with such large reimbursement payments that it
can operate less efficiently, yet provide more attractive cost-sharing
options.6 7 Therefore, despite the President's desire to provide increased
options to seniors, the MPDIMA legislation statutorily stacks incentives68 in
favor of managed care and thereby fails to produce the desired outcome.
A. Revising the Definition of "Out-of-Pocket Costs"
The existence of such a large coverage gap in Part D creates significant
concerns. Nonetheless, budgetary 69 and political limitations may preclude
complete drug coverage for the entire Medicare-eligible population.70 In
light of this financial strain, steps should be taken to minimize the effects of
the donut hole coverage gap. First, while it may increase the cost of this
legislation, modifying the definition of "out-of-pocket" expenses could
represent a significant step toward closing the legislation's coverage gap.
As noted earlier, the Part D prescription drug plan (PDP) provides the most
comprehensive coverage, but only after a beneficiary has incurred $3,600 in
out-of-pocket costs. 7 I Furthermore, MPDIMA's definition of "out-ofexpenditures, including
pocket cost" excludes virtually all third-party
72
employer retiree plan drug expenditures.
Currently, the legislation provides employers with a substantial incentive
to maintain existing retiree drug coverage. 3 However, the decision to
ignore employer outlays as an out-of-pocket cost arguably marginalizes this
incentive.74 Congress could consider retiree prescription drug plans as a
67. MORGAN & CHAIKIND, supra note 55, at 2.
68. See President Signs Medicare Act, supranote 37.
69. PrescriptionDrug Coverage and Medicare's Fiscal Challenges: Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. 11-14 (statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin,
available at http://www.cbo.gov/
Budget Office),
Director, Congressional
showdoc.cfm?index=4159&sequence=0 (Apr. 9, 2003).
70. NAT'L BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICARE, FINAL COMM. REPORT:
available at
BUILDING A BETrER MEDICARE FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW,

The
(Mar. 16, 1999).
http://medicare.commission.gov/medicare/bbmtt3l599.htm
framework detailed in the Commission's report outlined much less than complete
The decision by the commission, together with
prescription drug coverage for all seniors. Id.
fiscal constraints, precluded the successful proposal for universal Medicare drug coverage.
71. MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395w-102. The out-of-pocket expenditure level
necessary to trigger MPDIMA's most holistic coverage is $3600 in 2006 and this out-ofpocket expense will grow in subsequent years since this level is not indexed for inflation.
72. Id. § 1395w-102(b)(4)(C)(ii). The current provision creates a hard or true out-ofpocket cost.
73. Id. § 1395w-132.
This subsection prevents third-party employer
74. Id. § 1395w-102(b)(4)(C)(ii).
expenditures from qualifying as an "out-of-pocket cost" for purposes of the catastrophic cap.
Thus, employer or other third-party expenditures do not close the donut hole of coverage.
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form of deferred compensation. Such expenditures, while technically thirdparty in nature, could have counted as an out-of-pocket cost for the
purposes of satisfying the catastrophic cap.
By permitting the inclusion of employer spending within its statutory
definition, the legislation could have created a more efficient system.
Employers currently supplying retiree coverage could have capped their
current prescription drug benefit spending at the MPDIMA catastrophic
cap. By doing so, employers would have been able to cover most of their
employee's maximum annual financial exposure. Such a public-private
partnership could have potentially prevented a significant number of seniors
from being exposed to the substantial out-of-pocket expenses that the
existing coverage donut hole creates.
Instead, at best, the current legislation presents incomplete incentives to
employers.7" While the legislation may encourage some employers to
maintain prescription drug coverage, the subsidy may also entice employers
to provide only nominal coverage.76 Furthermore, because of the current
definition of "out-of-pocket cost, ' 77 the legislation may require enrollees to
face premiums, co-payments and the coverage gap, once seniors exhaust
their private-employer coverage plan.
Moreover, both the subsidy and the statutory definition of "out-of-pocket
cost" add significant expense to this legislation and only provide a marginal
benefit.
Thus, to create a more efficient and equitable Medicare
prescription drug benefit, Congress should re-craft MPDIMA to provide a
more expansive definition of "out-of-pocket cost."
B. ConcernsRegarding Cost-Sharingfor Medicare-Medicaid"Dual
Eligibles"
This legislation's impact upon dual eligibles 78 provides yet another
concern. Pursuant to MPDIMA and starting in 2006, Medicare will replace
Medicaid as the primary provider of prescription drug coverage for dual
eligibles. 79 This change in the coordination of benefits could have
significant health and financial consequences for certain dual-eligible

75. See id.
76. See MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395w-102(b)(4)(C)(ii) (2004). Employers may
only have an incentive to provide the minimum coverage necessary to qualify for the
subsidy.
77. Id. § 1395w-102.
78. DUAL ELIGIBLE DEFINITION, supra note 59.
79. MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1396u-5(a)(3). If an available Medicare sub-program
provides a particular type of benefit, then it is deemed to be its exclusive provider. Thus,
Medicaid acts as a programmatic, rather than a benefit, gap filler.
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seniors. 80 MPDIMA does not require plan operators to provide coverage
for the same drugs dual eligibles received under the state Medicaid
programs. MPDJMA will now require dual eligibles currently residing in
states with generous Medicaid benefits to make a statutorily-mandated copayment for each of their prescriptions.8 1 Currently, most state Medicaid
programs have either very nominal co-payments or no co-payment for
certain prescription drugs. 82 Thus, MPDIMA could force dual-eligible
seniors to face larger co-payments than they do under current state
Medicaid programs.
Dual eligibles experience high rates of chronic disease and have limited
financial options.83 Therefore, dual eligibles may base their decisions
regarding medication use on their ability to make the requisite co-payment
rather than medical necessity of a given prescription.84 Under MPDIMA,
such patient non-compliance is likely to increase.85 In order to address this
troubling phenomenon, Congress should amend the statutory language to
either reduce or eliminate the co-payment required of dual eligibles.86
C. The Drug FormularyRequirements Under PartD andMedicare
Advantage
Each drug plan approved by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) must have a drug formulary, which defines the specific
extent of drug coverage provided to enrollees.87 A committee comprised of
at least one pharmacist and physician must develop and review the
formulary.8 8 Specifically, both MA and PDP plans require a formulary
development process whereby the Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee
(PTC), using scientific evidence, determines the appropriate extent of
coverage. 89 MPDIMA mandates that an insurer's drug formulary provide at
80.

ISSUES FOR DUAL ELIGIBLES, supra note 60.

81. MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395w-11. The "lowest income dual eligible" copayment is either $1 for a multiple source drug or $3 for any other drug. Id.
82. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supranote 60, at 51-53.
83.
ISSUES FOR DUAL ELIGIBLES, supra note 60.
84. Geoffrey F. Joyce et al., Employer DrugBenefit Plans and Spending on Prescription
Drugs 288 JAMA 1733, 1733-39 (2002). See also Bruce Stuart & Christopher Zacker, Who
Bears the Burden of Medicaid Drug Copayment Polices?, HEALTH AFF. Mar.-Apr. 1999, at
201,202.
85.

ISSUES FOR DUAL ELIGIBLES, supra note 60.

86. MPDIMA, supranote 18, 1395w-i 14.
87. Id. § 1395w-104.
88. Id. (requiring that the membership of the "Pharmacy and Therapeutic Committee"
include "at least one practicing physician and one practicing pharmacist" and that both must
possess expertise in elder or disabled care and be free of any conflict of interest with respect
to the plan operator). Id.
89. Id. In developing and reviewing the formulary, the committee shall "base clinical
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least two drugs for each therapeutic class. 90 Furthermore, the statute
requires plan sponsors to inform enrollees about the composition of the
drug formulary. 9' Unfortunately, these minimal requirements create the
significant possibility that seniors may find their preferred drugs92 outside the
scope of plans available to them within their geographical area.
D. Development of Therapeutic Classes
The statute charges United States Pharmacoepia (USP) to develop its
own model categories and therapeutic classes to guide plan operators and
their respective PTCs.93 However, the legislation does not require plans to
follow USP guidelines and thus, significant incentives exist for companies
to deviate
from model classifications, potentially limiting drug options for
94
seniors.

Critics argue that allowing any deviation from USP model guidelines
may create a considerable hardship for seniors, especially for those who
require a particular brand of medication. 95 In contrast, supporters of the bill
would likely assert that the competitive market MPDIMA should result in
significant drug offerings. Yet, should the market succeed in offering most
seniors the drugs they need, market mechanisms may prove inadequate
under MPDIMA by failing to provide appropriate pharmaceutical coverage
for certain rare medical conditions.96 Additionally, plan operators may
choose to disenfranchise these patients by creating only the most cursory
form of therapeutic classes. 97 This will limit seniors' access to medicallydecisions on the strength of scientific evidence and standards of practice... and take into
account whether including in the formulary particular covered Part D drugs has therapeutic
advantages in terms of safety and efficacy." Id.
90. Id. (using the plural "drugs," which include drugs within each therapeutic category,
implies a requirement of two drugs per class).
91. MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395w-104 (2004).
92. ISSUES FOR DUAL ELIGIBLES, supra note 60.
93. MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395w-104.
94. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE FOR
MEDICARE

BENEFICIARIES:

A

SUMMARY

OF

THE

MEDICARE

PRESCRIPTION

DRUG

2003,
available
at
www.kff.org/medicare/6112.cfm (Dec. 10, 2003) (explaining that plans may have incentive
to deviate; however, those which follow the model guidelines set forth by the United States
Pharamacopeia are deemed anti-discriminatory as a matter of law).
95. See EDWIN PARK & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CTR. FOR BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES,
IMPROVEMENT

AND

MODERNIZATION

ACT

OF

MEDICARE AGREEMENT WOULD MAKE SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF SENIORS AND PEOPLE WITH

DISABILITIES WORSE OFF THAN UNDER CURRENT LAW, available at http://www.cbpp.org/1 118-03health.htm (Nov. 21, 2003).
96. ISSUES FOR DUAL ELIGIBLES, supra note 60.
97. PARK & GREENSTEIN, supra note 95 (explaining that HHS is charged with oversight
of formulary creation; such oversight could fail to remedy this problem of evasive
therapeutic class creation).
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necessary treatment.
E. Changes to the Formulary
The legislation permits plan operators to remove or replace any drug
from the formulary at any time throughout the enrollment period 98 by
merely providing notice of such a change on an Internet website. 99 Notably,
although plan operators may modify the terms of the formulary at any time,
enrollees may not change plans until the end of the calendar year during the
prescribed open enrollment period.' 00
To assure fairness, Congress should require every participating plan
operator to offer at least one plan that meets the USP guidelines in each
geographic market in which they operate. This would virtually guarantee
seniors access to all medically-necessary treatment options. Furthermore,
MPDIMA should prevent one-sided formulary modification by either
disallowing the deletion of drugs from the formulary during the enrollment
year, or by permitting enrollees to change plans following a mid-year
formulary modification. In doing so, Congress would place enrollees and
plan operators in a more equitable bargaining position and truly create the
market type conditions that the drafters of MPDIMA purported to establish.
F. The OverallSystemic Bias in Favor of Managed Care
The aforementioned factors demonstrate an embedded statutory bias in
favor of managed care. As previously mentioned, all Medicare Part D
enrollees seeking prescription drug coverage could face difficulties with the
coverage gap and limited drug formulary options. 10 1 Since MA plan
operators receive significant systemic advantages under this legislationincluding the $1.3 billion subsidy, greater plan flexibility, and higher rates
of per enrollee reimbursemen-the integrated MA program will likely offer
benefits not available to Part D PDP enrollees.10 2 Some of these benefits
98. MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395w-104 (stating that plan sponsors may remove
drugs subject to the limitations upon minimum number of drugs per therapeutic class).
99. Id. (explaining that Internet access and usage by the elderly is quite low as
compared to other age groups, according to a 2001 government survey which found that
63.9% of those twenty-five to forty-nine years of age had Intemet access while only 37.1%
over the age of fifty had such access). U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, NAT'L TELECOMMUNICS
AND INFO. ADMIN., A NATION ONLINE: How AMERICANS ARE EXPANDING THEIR USE OF THE
INTERNET, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/anationonline2.htm
(Feb.

2002).
100. MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395w-101. The statute does not permit mid-year
enrollment unless the change of formulary altered the actuarial equivalence of the given drug
plan.
101.
PARK ET AL., supra note 22.
102. MA FACT SHEET, supra note 52.
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may include a reduction in the coverage gap, lower premiums and copayments,10 3as well as programmatic benefits such as dental or vision
coverage.
Part D PDP enrollees will likely face sharp increases in monthly
premiums that are far greater than the anticipated rate of inflation. 10 4 In
fact, one estimate projects the Part D monthly premium to rise from $35 per
month to $58 by 2013.05 As enrollees face rising costs, many of the
healthiest seniors may either forego Part D PDP enrollment altogether or
join an MA plan that offers a minimal enrollment premium in exchange for
diminished services. 0 6 Either outcome would cause a downward spiral of
the program by skewing the distribution of those who remain. As a result
of this adverse selection problem, Part D enrollees may face even higher
premiums and co-payments than was originally foreseen, as well as the
potential withdrawal of plan operators from the Part D market.10 7
Over time, a downward spiral of Part D may leave many seniors with
only one viable option for drug coverage: the MA managed care program.
Therefore, many seniors may never truly experience the choice of care that
MPDIMA was created to provide. 0 8 Rather, MPDIMA may result in a
clandestine movement toward eliminating choice in Medicare through a
systematic stacking of incentives in favor of Medicare privatization.' 0 9
Therefore, this legislation contains a clear bias in favor of managed care
despite the fact that a large number of seniors do not wish to leave
traditional Medicare." 0 ) Congress should reconsider MPDIMA and revise
its incentive structure to provide seniors with the possibility of exercising a
genuine choice between enrollment in Part D and Medicare Advantage
(MA).

103. Id. Reduction of nominal co-payments, for example, may prove particularly
attractive to the dual-eligible population.
104. JOINT ECON. COMM. REP., supra note 42 (describing that the increase in premiums
is the result of the anticipated rise in medical expenses faced by the Medicare system).
105. Id.
106. Some MA plans may choose to provide minimal coverage at a lower cost to
enrollees. Healthier Medicare beneficiaries will enroll into these plans leaving only the
sickest seniors in the Part D plans.
107. See generally Berenson, supra note 36 (noting that such a downward spiral of plan
withdrawal is not without precedent. In fact, as a result of adverse selection as well as other
factors, many Part C Plus-Choice plans' operators have faced significant difficulties and thus
have withdrawn from a number of geographic markets).
108. President Signs Medicare Act, supra note 37.
109. Lieberman, supra note 22.
110.

REACTIONS TO THE NEW MEDICARE LAW, supra note 65.
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IV. MPDIMA'S COST CONTAINMENT PROVISION

In addition to modifications of the programmatic offerings, MPDIMA
also reforms other administrative and structural aspects of the Medicare
system."' Specifically, MPDIMA imposes a cost containment measure on
Medicare's budget. 1 2 The cost containment provision requires the trustees
of the Medicare program to both determine the amount of general revenue
funding spent during the current fiscal year and project the amount of
general revenue spending that will occur in the succeeding two fiscal
years.113 If general revenue spending exceeds forty-five percent of
Medicare's total expenditures," 4 then the statute requires the trustees to
declare a Medicare finding warning.l15
The invocation of the cost containment warning is primarily linked to
spending in Part B." 6 As noted earlier, Part B is the portion of Medicare
financed by general tax revenue which principally indemnifies enrollees'
outpatient and preventive care expenses." 7 In contrast, Part A derives
revenue from the payroll tax-financed Medicare trust fund and covers
inpatient care spending. 18 Yet, many recent efficiency gains in modem
outpatient health care have resulted in a reduction of inpatient
hospitalization,' 9 which has shifted expenditures covered by Part A to
those encompassed by Part B.' 20 However, despite the trend towards
greater utilization of outpatient services and the associated cost savings, the
MPDIMA cost-containment provision penalizes Medicare for gains in the
system's efficiency. In other words, under the current cost containment
provision, the more efficient modem medicine becomes, the closer
111.
112.
113.
114.
declare
outlays
115.
116.
117.
118.

MPDIMA, supranote 18, § 1395i.
42 U.S.C.A. § 801 (West 2004); MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395i.
MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395i(b)(4).
MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395i (stating that the trustees of the Medicare system
"Excess General Revenue Medicare Funding" when general revenue Medicare
exceed 45% of total Medicare expenditures).
Id.
Id.
MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395k(a).
MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395d-(a)(1).

119.
PAUL SHEKELLE & SALLY MORTON, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
DETERMINANTS OF INCREASES IN MEDICARE EXPENDITURES FOR PHYSICIANS' SERVS. 25,

available at http://www.ahrq.gov/downloads/pub/evidence/physservtr.doc (last visited Nov.
23, 2004). See also Bradley Strunk & Paul Ginsburg, Tracking Health Care Costs: Trends
Turn Downward in 2003, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 9, 2004, at 354, 356-357, at

http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.354vl ?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits= 1
0&RESULTFORMAT=&author1=Strunk&andorexacttitle=and&andorexacttitleabs=and&a
ndorexactfulltext=-and&searchid=l 102279795636_2163&stored search=&FIRSTINDEX=O
&sortspec=relevance&joumalcode=healthaff.
120. Id.
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Medicare moves towards a funding warning.
The funding warning under MPDIMA carries significant consequences
for the financial solvency of Medicare. The warning grants Congress and
the President authority to create legislation that eliminates excess general
revenue spending. 121 This authority may become a catalyst for the
Medicare program to raise premiums and cut the benefits available to
Medicare recipients under the auspices of a system-wide cost overrun.
Due to the shift in favor of Part B outpatient spending, the forty-five
percent cap appears to be a questionable metric for determining the need for
Medicare cost containment. As other federal spending is not subject to
similar caps, this arbitrary cap on spending is unprecedented. 122 Taken
together, MPDJMA's inherent bias towards more expensive managed care
and its misguided cost-containment strategy may threaten the financial
solvency of Medicare. Therefore, Congress should eliminate financial caps
in MPDIMA and instead create alternative mechanisms appropriately
designed to contain Medicare program costs. Specifically, Congress should
consider permitting the creation of a price negotiating authority or allowing
safe drug re-importation, in addition to modifying the health savings
accounts provision contained in MPDIMA.
V. ALTERNATIVE COST CONTAINMENT STRATEGIES

A. Best PriceNegotiation
Congress should adopt recent proposed legislation that would permit best
price negotiation. 123
"Best price" negotiating allows governmental
purchasers to achieve substantial reductions from full retail prices by
124
arranging discounts with the leverage of their purchasing power.
MPDIMA explicitly precludes Medicare officials from undertaking such a
cost-saving device. 125 Yet, the use of this mechanism is quite common in
other federal agencies and health care programs.12 6 For example, the
121. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1105 (West 2004) (collectively, these provisions create a strict
timeline for passage of legislation. Furthermore, floor debate and other procedural aspects
of bill consideration are also limited).
122. PARK ET AL., supra note 22.
123. H.R. 4321, 108th Cong. § 1 (2d Sess. 2004).
124. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: EXPANDING ACCESS TO
FEDERAL
PRICES
COULD
CAUSE
OTHER
PRICE
CHANGES
12,
available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00118.pdf (2004).
125. MPDIMA, supra note 18, § 1395w-102.
126. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: INCREASING BENEFICIARY
ACCESS AND RELATED IMPLICATIONS 14-16, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
h 100 100t.pdf (2000).
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Medicaid program, the Veterans Affairs Department, and other federal
government entities save substantial amounts of money each year through
best price-type negotiation practices. 27 Medicare administrators would
potentially reap savings for both enrollees and taxpayers if Congress
provided the administrators with complete authority to negotiate prices by
using bulk purchasing power.
B. Safe DrugRe-Importation
Safely managed drug re-importation has the potential to reduce both
governmental and consumer prescription drug expenditures. Therefore, in
the absence of the ability to negotiate for the best price, Congress should
explicitly permit the safe re-importation of drugs. 28 The current statutory
language contained in MPDIMA requires a safety certification by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS).129 Yet, the Secretary has,
to date, failed to allow any drug re-importation pursuant to his authority
under MPDIMA.130 Several bills have been introduced that would allow
safe drug re-importation to commence without the permission of the HHS
Secretary. 131
Congress should wait no longer for the Secretary's
certification and instead pass legislation that would create a mechanism for
the safe re-importation of prescription drugs, as it has the potential to lower
drug prices for Medicare beneficiaries.
C. Modifying Health Savings Accounts
A number of MPDIMA's provisions do not directly address the drug
benefit provision. One such provision is the creation of a tax-favored
account called a Health Savings Account (HSA).132 HSAs allow non-

127. Id.
128. 21 U.S.C.A. § 384 (West 2004).
129. Id. This section is only slated to become effective if the Secretary certifies that reimportation would both "pose no additional risk to the public's health and safety" and would
result in significant cost savings on the covered products. Id.
130. Press Release, Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Secretary Thompson Determines
that Safety Problems Make Drug Re-importation Unfeasible, available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/200lpres/20010710.html (July 10, 2001). But see HHSSecretary Thompson's Budget Overview Before House Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Labor, HHS and Education Appropriations, 108th Cong., available at
http://appropriations.house.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=35
l&WitnesslD=556 (last visited Nov. 23, 2004) (statement by Tommy Thompson, Secretary,
Dept. of Health and Human Services) (during this recent hearing, Secretary Thompson noted
that under certain limited circumstances he would support drug re-importation).
131. Pharm. Mkt. Access and Drug Safety Act of 2004, S.2328, 108th Cong. §§ 3-4
(2004).
132. MPDIMA, 26 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West 2004).
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elderly working individuals with high deductible health insurance policies
to make tax-deductible deposits into a specially-segregated HSA and
withdraw those funds for the payment of qualified medical services. 133 The
HSA provides a "front-end" tax advantage 134 similar to other provisions of
the tax code. 135 However, an HSA differs from other types of savings
accounts by providing an additional "back-end" tax advantage. 136
Despite their innocuous appearance, HSAs create several potential policy
difficulties. First, the unprecedented front- and back-end tax savings 1in
37
HSAs create a significant threat to the stability of the federal budget.
This favorable tax treatment may prevent enormous sums of money from
ever being subject to federal taxation and such loss of revenue must be
offset through either spending cuts or other forms of revenue generation.
The dual front- and back-end tax savings of these accounts is unnecessary.
Rather, the simple provision of a front-end tax deduction creates a sufficient
incentive for an individual to fund his HSA account.
Beyond the specific loss of revenue associated with these accounts,
HSAs threaten a fundamental concept of the tax code. 138 The precedent set
by this legislation creates pressure to provide more favorable tax treatment
to other savings accounts, 139 such as those sanctioned by Section 401(k) of
the Internal Revenue Code 140 and other tax-deferred saving accounts such
as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). 141 In fact, some lobbyists have
already begun promoting the idea of allowing retirees to convert portions of
their tax-deferred savings accounts into Retirement Medical Benefit
Accounts (RMBAs). 142 However, budget forecasters anticipate an influx of
133. Id.
134. Id. § 223 (a).
135. 26 U.S.C. § 408 (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2000) (regulating IRA and 401(k)
accounts that feature front end tax savings, whereby individuals can contribute their income
and thereby avoid taxation both before and during the time in which their money remains in
the segregated account).
136. 26 U.S.C.A. § 223(f)(1) (regulating recipients receipt of a back-end tax advantage
as they incur no taxation when funds are withdrawn from the HSA account and used for
qualified medical expenses).
137. See Robert Greenstein & Edwin Park, CTR. FOR BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES,
HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS IN FINAL MEDICARE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT POSE THREATS
BOTH TO LONG TERM FISCAL POL'Y AND TO THE EMPLOYER BASED HEALTH INS. SYS.,

availableat http://www.cbpp.org/10-27-03health.htm (Dec. 1, 2003).
138. Id.
139. EDWIN PARK & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CTR. FOR BUDGET AND

POL'Y PRIORITIES,
NEW RETIREMENT MEDICAL ACCOUNT PROPOSAL WOULD CREATE LUCRATIVE TAX SHELTER
AND SWELL DEFICITS, BUT Do LITTLE TO HELP LOW AND MODERATE INCOME SENIORS WITH

HEALTH CARE COSTS, availableat http://www.cbpp.org/4-1904health.htm (July 22, 2004).

140.
141.
142.

26 U.S.C. § 401(k).
26 U.S.C. § 408 (2000).
Id. (proposal would allow tax-free withdraw of the converted funds in a manner

Published by LAW eCommons, 2005

19

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 14 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 7

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 14

massive tax revenues as millions of the current adult generation retire and
draw upon their tax-deferred 401(k) and IRAs. This revenue could be lost
if RMBA conversions were allowed. Thus, the HSA legislation should be
amended to eliminate the provisions that would place a substantial strain on
the Medicare and Social Security programs as well as the overall federal
budget.
HSAs also may undermine the affordability of comprehensive employer
provided health insurance if enrollees must use HSAs in conjunction with
high deductible health insurance plans.143 The healthiest or most affluent
workers may opt into these plans. 144 If those workers were removed from
the available low deductible insurance pool, insurers would have difficulty
affordably grouping the remaining risk. Thus, this legislation may increase
the premiums for those not enrolled in a high deductible insurance plan. 145
Congress should modify the HSA provision as contained in MPDIMA by
removing the favorable treatment of back-end tax provided to HSAs.
Additionally, Congress should eliminate the required link between HSAs
and high deductible insurance, thereby allowing all insured persons to use
such accounts regardless of the size of their particular deductible.
VI. AN RX FOR THE REFORM OF MPDIMA
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003 represents the most significant overhaul of the Medicare system
since its creation. For many individuals, the legislation represents progress
towards providing America's seniors with an optimal degree of outpatient
prescription drug coverage. Yet, the legislation is far from efficient.
Currently, MPDIMA has an aggregate projected cost of approximately
$534 billion for the decade between 2004 and 2014.146 Reform of
MPDIMA, as outlined herein, should create a more expansive, less
expensive program than that which currently exists. Therefore, Congress
should consider the aforementioned modifications of MPDIMA so as to
create a more favorable prescription drug benefit.
First, to curtail programmatic costs, Congress should abandon
MPDIMA's so-called cost containment device and instead employ real cost
control measures such as best price negotiation, safe drug re-importation,
similar to Health Savings Accounts).
143.

26 U.S.C.A. § 223(c)(1)(A) (West 2004).
PARK & GREENSTEIN, supra note 139.
145. Id.
146. The Health and Human Services Fiscal Year 2005 Budget: Hearing on HHS Fiscal
Year 2005 Budget Before House Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. 11-14, available
at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t0402lO.html (Feb. 12, 2003) (statement of Tommy
Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human Services).

144.
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and removal of the back-end tax advantage currently provided to Health
Savings Accounts (HSAs). Using these cost reductions, Congress should
modify MPDIMA's treatment of dual eligibles by reducing or eliminating
their required co-payment. Additionally, Congress should redefine "out-ofpocket cost" to allow employer spending to effectively compliment
MPDIMA, thus potentially sparing many retirees from exposure to the
standard coverage donut hole. To improve the quality of care provided by
Medicare, new legislation should require plan operators to offer at least one
plan in each geographic area, which strictly comports with the model
guidelines crafted by United States Pharmacoepia (USP).
These
requirements would ensure that each and every senior receives a baseline
form of coverage as well as a more genuine choice between the newly
constituted fee for service Medicare and managed care plans operated
through Medicare Advantage. Furthermore, savings from cost-containment
strategies such as best price negotiation or safe drug re-importation and
revisions to the aforementioned HSA provisions can help fund these efforts.
A prescription drug benefit for seniors has been long overdue. However,
MPDIMA increases costs and forces seniors into an inefficient and
restrictive managed care system with the potential to threaten the solvency
of Medicare.
Accordingly, Congress should modify the MPDIMA
legislation so that seniors receive less expensive, but more expansive
coverage while taxpayers enjoy a more efficient system.
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